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The Inevitibility of Regional Variation in the United Kingdom
Abstract
First, the general history of the different regions must be considered, to the degree that explains innate
qualities of specific regions. This can assist in understanding the roots of regional variation. Second, the
situation of regional governance in the UK is important as it is the vehicle by which the current situation
has risen and progress and change can be made. Third, it is best to look at both the history and current
situation of economic statistics with special regard to regional differences in GDP per capita and the
unemployment rate. Also to be considered is the idea of a “regional problem” and the criteria that
collectively determine what qualifies as a problem. And fourth, I will explain the differences and
hypothesize as to why they exist and what will happen in the future. I will look at the theoretical imbalance
in the government through population and social analysis, and the practical imbalances through
economic analysis. Through this, I intend to show the inevitability of regional imbalance in the UK.
Moreover, the UK government must recognize these issues as regional and move to set up regional
governments to aid the situation and improve each region. Inequity is inevitable, but when a large inequity
is present, the government must intercede to diminish it.
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The Inevitability of Regional
Variation in the United Kingdom
John Haugen
I. INTRODUCTION
future. I will look at the theoretical imbalance in the
he most recent progress in the United
government through population and social analysis,
Kingdom to confront issues of regional imbaland the practical imbalances through economic
ance was New Labour’s move to form the
analysis. Through this, I intend to show the
Scottish Parliament and Welsh and Northern Ireland
inevitability of regional imbalance in the UK.
Assemblies. The movement was brought forth to recMoreover, the UK government must recognize these
ognize and decrease some of the regional variations
issues as regional and move to set up regional govthat exist in the UK. However, this legislation did not
ernments to aid the situation and improve each
consider the many regional issues within England,
region. Inequity is inevitable, but when a large
and has left the entire UK government with an imbalinequity is present, the government must intercede to
ance in representation. Since part of the reason to
diminish it.
devolve governance was to increase local economic
II. HISTORY OF UK REGIONS: ACCEPTABLE
control, it should be noted that there are differences
IMBALANCE
between regions in
England that are
There are
as wide as the
some types of
“There are differences between regions in i n e q u i t i e s
differences
between England
regions
England that are as wide as the differences between
and Scotland or
that are tolerable.
between England and Scotland or Wales.” Since, at the very
Wales. To better
understand these
least, the 18th
issues, why they
century, London
exist, and what can be done (if anything) to solve
has been a global power in the finance and trade.
them, a few ideas must also be analyzed that parallel
“During the course of the 18th century, City merthe issue of regionalization and devolution.
chants, ship owners, and bankers gained large forFirst, the general history of the different
tunes from maritime trade and the acquisition of new
regions must be considered, to the degree that
colonies” (Clout, 70). The economic prominence of
explains innate qualities of specific regions. This can
London can possibly be traced back even further to
assist in understanding the roots of regional variation.
the guilds and livery companies from the 16th and
Second, the situation of regional governance in the
17th centuries. Whatever way one views the situaUK is important as it is the vehicle by which the curtion, London has always been, comparatively speakrent situation has risen and progress and change can
ing, more economically advanced than the rest of the
be made. Third, it is best to look at both the history
UK. Because of its proximity to the North Sea via the
and current situation of economic statistics with speThames, its political importance, and its rich economcial regard to regional differences in GDP per capita
ic history, it is inevitable that London will continue as
and the unemployment rate. Also to be considered is
an economic power, especially relative to other
the idea of a “regional problem” and the criteria that
regions in the UK.
collectively determine what qualifies as a problem.
Just as London’s history is important to its
And fourth, I will explain the differences and hypotheconomic
position at the present, the manufacturing
esize as to why they exist and what will happen in the
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sector has had great influence on cities in northern
England. Because of the large decline in the manufacturing sector — partly due to the decrease in coal
consumption and the increase in international steel
competition — the northern areas of England have
begun to decline economically. Part of this decline is
inevitable; certain industries can eventually fall and
the dependence on one specific industry by a region
can cause a problem. This type of inequity is
inevitable and can be explained by the theory of capitalism. There is and should be no method of decreasing these inequities. However, to what degree the
decline should be allowed is the question. The point
at which the decline should be confronted and policy
should be implemented to counteract it is a matter I
will consider in Section V.

UK Nations

South

Central

North

consider both the Protestant and the Catholic side. Its
assembly of 108 and executive of 12 are even numbers so as to give equal representation to both sides.
Also, the First Minister and the Deputy Minister must
be of opposing parties, with the First Minister from
the majority party and the Deputy Minister from the
lead opposition party. This allows for there to be
equal consideration at both the executive and assembly levels in an attempt to appease the religious turmoil and estabTABLE 1
lish a government
Regional Population
that will successPopulation
fully
consider
(2001)
Region
both sides. What
United
Kingdom
58,788,990
the
Northern
North
East
2,520,462
Ireland situation
North West
6,728,562
shows us, more
Yorkshire and
III. REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS: DEVOLUthan the Scottish
the Humber
4,961,376
TION
or Welsh governEast Midlands
4,182,676
In the 1970s, it was decided to promote
ments, is that
West Midlands
5,264,190
regional issues and to help shift tripartite regional
each devolved
East
5,389,020
London
7,187,184
strategy to have more of “a concentration on the
government is
South
East
8,008,980
regional economy, social welfare, and allocation of
tailored to the
South
West
4,934,259
public expenditure” (Hogwood, 188). Despite the
region, recognizEngland
49,246,218
movement toward establishment of regional governing the differWales
2,902,480
ments in the UK, the late 1970s attempts failed due to
ences that exist
Scotland
5,064,200
Northern
improper organisation and a lack of general public
between them.
Ireland
1,689,258
support. The next major movement was in 1998,
However,
when Tony Blair and his New Labour government
if one were to look at the population of the four
held referenda to determine the best route for devolunations: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern
tion in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland
Ireland, and then would consider how the regional
(O’Neill, 171). The biggest result of the ensuing leggovernments are set up, it would be clear that there is
islation was the
an imbalance. For
Scottish Parliament,
example, Scotland,
which has full lega nation of 5 mil“England
has
always
been,
comparatively
islative power in all
lion people posareas
except
speaking, more economically advanced sesses far higher
defense, elections,
control than the
than the rest of the UK.”
and foreign affairs.
people of Wales, a
The
Welsh
nation of 3 million
Assembly contrasts
people.
England,
this, with Cardiff possessing fewer powers; essentialwith a population of just fewer than 50 million, has
ly, “the Welsh Assembly has executive but no primany of its issues voted on by MPs from Scotland,
mary legislative functions enjoyed by the Scottish
Wales, and Northern Ireland. Through simply lookParliament” (O’Neill, 185).
ing at the population in the different regions of the
The Northern Ireland Assembly, though curUK, it is evident that the regional control is superior
rently suspended due to the religious conflict, posin certain areas over others. Scotland’s population is
sesses similar attributes to the Welsh Assembly in
very similar in size to that of 4 regions in England:
terms of what it is allowed to govern. However, more
Southwest, East, West Midlands, and Yorkshire and
important in the situation is the Assembly’s ability to
the Humber. Only 3 English regions have a populaThe Park Place Economist, Volume XIII

97

John Haugen

TABLE 2
GDP per capita

UK
Nations

South

Central

North

UK Nations

South

Central

North

steadily above the UK average. While the market theory suggests that these should at some
Change
Region
GDP per capita
from 1981- point in time converge without intervention, it
1999
UK Average = 100
1981 1989 1999
seems as if they are diverging at steady rates
North East
94.3
83.9
77.3
-17
with little sign of relenting. Granted, a change
North West
94.3
91.3
86.9
-7.4
of 1-2 points is not extraordinary, as in the case
Yorkshire and the
of the West Midlands, London, and Southeast.
Humber
93
89.3
87.9
-5.1
But the change that underwent in the East,
East Midlands
100
96.6
93.6
-6.4
Northwest, and Northeast is quite significant
West Midlands
90.6
91.8
91.7
1.1
and is possibly beyond the realm of explanation
East
97.3 114.2 116.4
19.1
by the market theory. There might be a force
London
N/A 128.5
130
1.5
South East
115 111.6 116.4
1.4
acting upon those regions that is making its sucSouth West
95.9
92.5
90.8
-5.1
cess or failure artificially high. I will examine
England
N/A 102.3 102.4
0.1
this in Section V.
Wales
88.4
84
80.5
-7.9
Another imbalance that exists is in averScotland
98.7
95.6
96.5
-2.2
age household income. The household income
Northern Ireland
74.3
74.7
77.5
3.2
of the north is significantly smaller than the UK
tion that is significantly greater than Scotland:
average, while the income of the southern regions is
London, Southeast, and Northwest, while the
substantially higher than the average. Given that
Northeast and East Midlands have populations signifsome of the difference can be attributed to the higher
icantly less. Though proportionately it would make
cost of living in areas such as London, the data still
sense for the regions of England to devolve, the situoutweigh the differences as the major cities in the UK
ation is better analyzed with economic statistics to
have a similar cost of living. Again, the north-south
see the greater picture in terms of the imbalance.
divide is made evident as the household income in the
north is between 50 and 100 pounds lower than the
IV. ECONOMICS STATISTICS: PAST AND
UK average and in the Southeast and London it is 106
PRESENT
to 135 pounds greater than the UK average. Though
The economic differences between the
this is not a factor in determining the regional probregions — especially within England — also indicate
that there is a need to improve certain regions. For
TABLE 3
there to be a “regional problem”, or severe inequality
Household Income
between regions and the national averages, there
Mean
must be five specific statistical qualifications: low
Weekly
Household
growth of GDP per capita, high and persistent unemIncome
ployment, dependence on a heavy industrial base,
(£)
Region
decline in manufacturing, inadequate infrastructure,
United Kingdom
480
and net migration out of the region (Griffiths, 194).
North East
380
North West
430
The “north versus south” issue has been plaguing
Yorkshire and the
England since the decline of the manufacturing secHumber
432
tor. The Northeast, Northwest, and Yorkshire and the
East Midlands
449
Humber regions have all experienced some sort of
West Midlands
462
regional problem. In turn, I will present and analyze
East
510
statistics that represent the regional problem, as
London
615
defined or otherwise.
South East
586
GDP per capita steadily declined in the northSouth West
449
England
496
ern regions and rose in the southern regions from
Wales
376
1989 to 1999. The three regions in the north underScotland
419
went a significant decrease, and three of the four
Northern Ireland
370
regions in the south have remained the only regions
98
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decades. In spite of the aggregate move toward service businesses and away from manufacturing, the
divide is still apparent today. Again, the north-south
divide is quite evident in the statistics. Industry
accounts for a significantly lower percentage in the
south as only the Southwest is at the same level of
industrial contribution to GDP. However, all regions
other than the four in the south still experience industrial contribution to GDP on a higher level than the
UK average. The regions with the highest GDP have
the lowest percentage of industrial contribution, and
vice versa.
The final statistic I will examine is that of
unemployment. Since 1998, it has declined a whole
percentage point in the UK, but this decline is repre-

TABLE 4
Net Migration 1

7

20

15

17

-9
16
-17
28
23
53
6
15
2

1
34
55
18
39
185
5
-5
-1

South

Central North

TABLE 5
Percent of GDP from Sectors (2001)
Manufacturing
(%)
28.2
36.2
32.8
34.6

Service
(%)
70.4
63.0
66.2
63.8

East Midlands

36.7

61.3

West Midlands
East
London
South East
South West
England
Wales
Scotland
Northern Ireland

37.4
25.1
16.6
22.4
28.6
27.6
34.8
31.8
27.7

61.2
73.3
83.4
76.8
68.9
71.2
63.4
66.2
68.3

Region
United Kingdom
North East
North West
Yorkshire & the Humber

North

lem as defined by Griffiths and Wall, it is quite
indicative of quality of living, types of jobs, and overall wealth of a region.
There has been no net migration out of the
regions in England due to a strong increase in emigrants to England. However, if the net migration statistics are compared between the regions, it is evident
that the poorest regions have experienced little or no
growth in comparison to the rapid migration into the
richer regions. In this regard, it can still qualify as a
regional problem as a large percentage of people are
not moving into the regions but are strengthening and
moving into others.
The reliance on industry of the individual
regions has been apparent since for the last few

UK
Nations

TABLE 6
Unemployment in those of
Working Age

Net migration in thousands of people

Central

1

West Midlands
East
London
South East
South West
England
Wales
Scotland
Northern Ireland

2000
-1
2

South

UK
Nations

South

East Midlands

1991
2
-12

UK Nations

Central

North

Region
North East
North West
Yorkshire and the
Humber

% of working age Umemp.
United Kingdom
North East
North West
Yorkshire and the Humber

1998
6.3
8.2
6.7
7.1

2002
5.2
6.9
5.5
5.4

East Midlands

4.9

4.2

West Midlands
East
London
South East
South West
England
Wales
Scotland
Northern Ireland

6.4
5.1
8.2
4.4
4.6
6.1
6.8
7.5
7.4

5.5
3.5
6.6
4
3.6
4.9
6.1
6.8
5.6

sented regionally in various ways. The Northeast has
been consistently 1.5 to 2 points higher than the average, as has London. This goes against the typical
profile of London as a prosperous and economically
above-average region; it is possibly due to the large
number of people living in a confined area vying for
a confined number of jobs. Nonetheless, three of the
four most affluent regions — the Southeast, East, and
Southwest — have the lowest unemployment and are
substantially below the national average. The less
wealthy regions are slightly above, with the exception of the Northeast, which is quite far above the
level.
What these statistics show us is that the
Northeast — with its high unemployment, low GDP
per capita, low household income, high industry, and
stagnant population relative to the UK averages — is

The Park Place Economist, Volume XIII

99

John Haugen
the one region that has a substantial “regional problem”. London, the East, and especially the Southeast,
all have profiles opposite to the Northeast and have
continued their economic superiority through the last
few decades. Yorkshire, the Northwest, and both
Midlands regions are typically below the UK averages in most of the statistical areas, but to a far lesser degree than the
Northeast when
all of the statistics
A regional economic
are considered.

ernments are able to better promote their interests and
work toward solving the issues to make them more
competitive and viable. To enhance the draw on
labor and capital from other regions, the government
must be able to set policies that give incentives to
potential entrants. Also, there must be a strong infrastructure set up to aid in the transport of goods and
capital and to
make the potential for expansion
problem exists if there i n c r e a s e .
is low growth of GDP per capita, high and Promotion of
growth of the
persistent unemployment, dependence on a region’s interests
heavy industrial base, decline in manufac- causes the GDP
per capita to
turing, inadequate infrastructure, and net increase and
unemployment to
migration of the region.
fall.

V. ANALYSIS
As more
companies spring
up in the service
sector and manufacturing companies shrink and
outsource,
the
richer areas that had always been reliant on the service sector (e.g. London and the Southeast) will
become richer and the poorer, manufacturing-centered regions (e.g. Northeast and Yorkshire) will
become poorer (Notes, 16/11). Though the government tries to foster convergence to more equal prosperity, the experience has been that there is actual
divergence in which rich regions are becoming richer
and poor regions are becoming poorer.
This is due to a number of reasons. First, the
labor market suffers because the jobs lost are often
not replaced by service sector jobs, they are simply
moved to other regions, causing higher unemployment. Second, the younger generations find that
there are less opportunities in the poorer regions and
decide to be educated and work in the richer and
more prosperous areas, causing an outflow of productive labor from the poor regions. Third, as the businesses fail and become less productive, the amount of
money granted to and raised by the community
through taxes and philanthropy decreases, causing
the maintenance and building of infrastructure to falter. These factors cause the GDP per capita to
decrease in the long run. This is a cyclical example
of how the poor become poorer, and the point at
which the decline becomes endemic is when the government must intercede.
I believe regional governments work better
than the UK Parliament in assisting fallen regions and
preventing a divergent economy. The regional gov100

VI. CONCLUSION
The regional variations in the United
Kingdom, though it is a relatively small country, are
accounted for by a combination of elements. First,
the history of a region and its economy, even dating
back a few centuries, can impact a region far into its
future. The effect of finance on London 400 years
ago, combined with the northern dependence on colonial industrialization 150 years ago impacts the
economies of these regions today. Second, the
regional governance that is currently in action affects
the regional variations, but it is a force that works to
counteract them (in situations such as Scotland and
Wales) to bring the region back up to or above the UK
average levels. Third, along with the social history of
an area, the statistical history of an area can often
determine how a region can tailspin into a regional
problem and the effects of it maintaining its position
at the bottom of the scale.
All of these contribute to the economic position of a region, but the cause is an outside force that
acts upon the situation in a specific region. The statistics are merely the explanatory variables following
the change. However, the impetus behind the change
lies in certain outside forces acting on regional predispositions. For example, as the manufacturing sector rose in the 1950s due to rebuilding efforts after the
war and the large need for steel, it was prone to
decline due to the lack of a need for coal and the
declining rebuilding efforts. The further move
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toward the service sector sealed the fate of many
northern cities. The outside forces cause the change
to occur, but the only reason the economic statistics
changed and the regions went into decline was due to
the heavy dependence on manufacturing. As this is
the case, there is no method of halting an outside variable; rather, these forces, whether they are unexpected or not, cannot entirely be prevented. They are the
reason that the regional inequities persist and the histories of the regions play into the equation.
As such, the inequities between regions are
represented by different concentrations and types of
business, labor, demographical tendencies, jobs,
wealth, and political power. These differences are
inevitable because of history coupled with the
unavoidable forces that act on a country. I believe
that a government should allow these inequities to
exist, however, it must be on a natural level. As soon
as the problem becomes common and recurring, the
government must take measures to help it improve as
naturally as it can. Building up infrastructure and
providing incentives to private enterprise as well as
social programs to help counteract the destructive
effects of unemployment, can be the fastest and most
durable form of aid to break the cyclical and
inevitable form of inequity.
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